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Abstract
We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine
the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of
individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks
one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that
when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of eÆcient networks
(those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly
stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use
that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly
stable networks via a \top convexity" condition on the value function on networks. We
also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and
examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous{depending on player
labels.
JEL classication numbers: A14, C72, C72
Key words: networks, network formation, eÆciency, stability, strong stability, core, strong
equilibrium
Strongly Stable Networks

Matthew O. Jackson Anne van den Nouweland
1 Introduction
The importance of networks in a variety of social and economic settings is well-documented.
Applications range from social networks such as friendships to more directly economically
motivated ones such as trading alliances, decentralized market relationships, research
partnerships, etc. Given that network relationships matter, it is important to under-
stand which networks are likely to form and how this depends on the structure of the
setting. In particular, there has been a good deal of recent research into understanding
how networks form among a group of individuals (people, rms, etc.) who have the
discretion to choose with whom they interact.
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In this paper, we continue that line of research through a careful study of the existence
and properties of strongly stable networks: those networks which are stable against
changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable networks are those which
are supported by strong Nash equilibria of an appropriate game of network formation.
There are many reasons for studying a strong notion of stability based on coalitional
considerations. In network formation, individual or pairwise based solution concepts such
as Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) often lead
to many stable networks, so that they provide broad predictions. In some contexts this
already narrows things, but in other contexts it may leave us with a large set of net-
works. Moreover, these networks may have very dierent properties so that additional
considerations may help us to sort among them to produce narrower and more accurate
predictions of network formation. (See Example 1, below, for an illustration.) In partic-
ular, in many contexts, there will naturally be communication among individuals that
may allow a number of them to coordinate their choices of links. As such, we study
strongly stable networks as a natural way for making tighter predictions using coalitional

An earlier and incomplete version of this paper was entitled \EÆcient and Stable Networks and their
Relationship to the Core," (August 1999). This supersedes that version. We began this work during a
visit of Anne van den Nouweland to Caltech in April of 1999, and we thank Caltech for its hospitality.
Support of the National Science Foundation under grant SBR-9729568 is also gratefully acknowledged.
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For bibliographies on network study generally and network formation in particular, we refer the
reader to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) and Dutta and Jackson (2001).
considerations. One can think of a notion such as pairwise stability as a weak stability
concept which is essentially a necessary (and some times too weak) condition for stability,
while strong stability is a suÆcient (and some times too strong) condition for stability.
Strong stability of networks is a very demanding property, as it means that no set
of players could benet through any rearranging of the links that they are involved with
(including those linking them to players outside the coalition). As such, we expect there
to be contexts where such networks will not exist. However, strongly stable networks
still exist in a number natural settings, including a number that pop up in the literature
as examples of network situations. In situations where strongly stable networks exist
they are quite compelling, in the sense that once formed such networks are essentially
impossible to destabilize, as there is no possible reorganization that would be improving
for all of the players whose consent is needed.
Another reason for examining the existence of strongly stable networks, beyond their
compelling stability properties, is that such networks exhibit additional properties. For
instance, as we shall show, if a network is strongly stable and has more than one com-
ponent, then value must be allocated equally among members of each component, and
in fact the per capita value must be equal across components. This is a very strong
equity property. More importantly, strongly stable networks have strong eÆciency prop-
erties. One obvious property is Pareto eÆciency. But if the value of each component
of a network is allocated equally among the members of that component of a network,
then when strongly stable networks exist they exhibit even stronger eÆciency properties.
In this case, strongly stable networks maximize the overall value of the network. This
statement actually takes a bit of proof as we shall show, as although it is obvious if a
network consists of just one component, it is more subtle when eÆcient networks consist
of several components.
Motivation for the study of the existence of networks that are eÆcient and satisfy
some stability requirement comes out of the previous literature. From previous research,
we know that there are a variety of contexts where the stability of networks can be
at odds with eÆciency. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that for some settings the
sets of pairwise stable networks and eÆcient networks do not intersect. Moreover, for
some value functions they showed that this is true regardless of how value is allocated
or transferred among players, provided the allocation respects component balance and
anonymity (which are formally dened below). Jackson (2001) goes on to show that
even a weaker form of eÆciency is at odds with pairwise stability, and that in some
very natural contexts even Pareto eÆciency can be widely incompatible with pairwise
stability.
The tension between stability and eÆciency suggests several directions for further
study. One is to examine whether the tension disappears if we are free to construct the
allocation rule in careful and non-anonymous ways. This angle is pursued by Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997) who show that careful construction of allocation rules that may be
non-anonymous (on unstable networks) can restore the compatibility between eÆciency
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and stability.
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Another direction is to identify those settings for which there is no tension
between stability and eÆciency (or at least that there is an overlap between the two) when
keeping with anonymity. That direction is pursued both in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
and Jackson (2001), when the concept in question is pairwise stability. The current paper
is in that same spirit, but moves beyond pairwise stability to strong stability. As we shall
see, eÆcient networks and strongly stable networks will coincide when the latter exist.
Of course, the existence of strongly stable networks is of interest beyond eÆciency, given
that such networks are robust to all kinds of deviations, as we have already discussed
above.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide denitions. In Section
3 we rst show that the existence of strongly stable networks requires an egalitarian
allocation. Next, we characterize the existence of strongly stable networks under the
component-wise egalitarian allocation rule in terms of nonemptiness of the core of a
closely related cooperative game. We use this in Section 4 to obtain a characterization
of the value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks, showing that a
\top convexity" condition is both necessary and suÆcient. We provide applications of
these results to a variety of settings. In Section 5 we move on to consider side payments,
showing that the characterizations in the previous sections relating to the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule are in fact necessary for any allocation rule when strong
stability allows for side payments. Finally, we close the paper with some results on
non-anonymous value functions in Section 6 and some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Denitions
Networks
There is a set N = f1; : : : ; ng of players who may be involved in network relationships.
Non-directed graphs are used to model the network relations between players.
3
In such
a graph the nodes (vertices) correspond to the players and the links (edges) correspond to
bilateral relationships between players. Let g
N
be the set of all subsets of N of size 2, and
similarly for any S  N let g
S
be the set of all subsets of S of size 2. G = fg j g  g
N
g
is the set of all possible networks or graphs on N .
The link between players i and j is denoted by ij.
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Another interesting direction, not as closely related to what we examine here, is to study situations
where the allocation rule and networks are formed simultaneously and endogenously. This is explored
in Currarini and Morelli (2000), Mutuswami and Winter (2000) and Slikker and van den Nouweland
(2001b). As shown by Currarini and Morelli (2000), at least for some bargaining protocols, eÆciency
can be regained in some settings.
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For some analysis of network formation in directed networks see Bala and Goyal (2000) and Dutta
and Jackson (2000). The general problem of strong stability in directed networks has not been studied.
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A network g induces a partition (g) of the player set N , where two players i and j are
in the same partition element if and only if there exists a path
4
in the graph connecting
i and j (using the convention that there is a path from each player to him or herself).
For any S 2 (g), g(S) denotes the subgraph of g on the set S, i.e., g(S) = g \ g
S
.
The components of a network g, denoted C(g), are dened by C(g) = fg(S)jS 2
(g); jSj  2g. The restriction that jSj  2 rules out empty networks as components.
The Value of a Network
The value of a network is given by a value function v : G ! IR. We normalize v so
that v(;) = 0. The set of all such value functions is denoted V .
A value function is anonymous if for any permutation of the set of players  (a
bijection from N to N), v(g

) = v(g), where g

= f(i)(j)jij 2 gg.
Anonymity says that the value of a network is derived from the structure of the
network and not the labels of the players who occupy certain positions. For many of
the results we will restrict our attention to anonymous value functions, and we discuss
extensions to non-anonymous value functions in a later section of the paper.
A value function is component additive if v(g) =
P
h2C(g)
v(h) for all g 2 G.
Component additivity precludes that the value of a given component of a network
depends on how other components are organized. This precludes externalities across
components of a network. However, it still allows for externalities within components.
That is, the value of a given component, and ultimately each player's payo, can depend
on the way that the network is structured. For example, the value of f12; 23g can dier
from f12; 23; 13g, and so, for instance, player 2's payo may depend on whether 1 and 3
are linked.
Allocation Rules
An allocation rule is a function Y : GV ! IR
n
describes how the value of a network
is distributed among the players. The payo of player i 2 N in network g with a value
function v under allocation rule Y is denoted Y
i
(g; v).
The allocation function may arise naturally, or might also represent additional trans-
fers of value among players. We can be agnostic on whether the allocation rule arises
naturally, is derived from some bargaining among players, or is forced by some govern-
ment or other intervening party.
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
P
i2S
Y
i
(g; v) = v(g(S)) for each com-
ponent additive v, g 2 G and S 2 (g).
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Formally, a path in g from i to j is a sequence of players i
1
; : : : ; i
K
such that i
k
i
k+1
2 g for each
k 2 f1; : : : ;K   1g, with i
1
= i and i
K
= j.
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Component balance requires that the value of a given component of a network is
allocated to the members of that component in cases where the value of the component
is independent of how other components are organized. This would tend to arise naturally.
It also is a condition that an intervening planner or government would like to respect if
they wish to avoid secession by components of the network.
An allocation rule Y is component decomposable if Y
i
(g; v) = Y
i
(g(S); v) for each
component additive v, g 2 G, S 2 (g), and i 2 S.
Component decomposability requires that in situations where v is component additive,
the way in which value is allocated within a component does not depend on the structure
of other components. So, in situations where there are no externalities across components,
the allocation within a component is independent of the rest of the network.
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v 2 V , g 2 G, and permutation of
the set of players , Y
(i)
(g

; v

) = Y
i
(g; v) , where the value function v

is dened by
v

(g) = v(g

 1
) for each g 2 G.
Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the labels of
the players and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly corresponding
fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling.
Given any v 2 V , the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y
ce
is dened by
Y
ce
i
(g; v) =
v(g(S
i
))
jS
i
j
;
where S
i
2 (g) is the unique partition element containing player i.
The component-wise egalitarian rule is one where the value of each component is split
equally among the members of the component. This allocation rule is anonymous, com-
ponent balanced, and component decomposable, and satises nice egalitarian properties
in terms of equalizing payos (at least within the limit of component balance).
As we shall see, this allocation rule will actually emerge naturally if one wishes to
have strongly stable networks, and will play a key role in the characterization of value
functions that allow such networks.
EÆciency and Stability Notions
A network g is eÆcient with respect to v if v(g)  v(g
0
) for all g
0
2 G.
We denote the set of networks that are eÆcient with respect to value function v by
E(v).
Note that an eÆcient network always exists since there are only nitely many networks
in G. This is a strong notion of eÆciency as it requires the maximization of total value.
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It only corresponds to Pareto eÆciency if the value is freely and fully transferable across
all components of a network.
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The following denition of coalitional deviation is used in dening the strong stability
notion.
A network g
0
2 G is obtainable from g 2 G via deviations by S if
(i) ij 2 g
0
and ij =2 g implies ij  S, and
(ii) ij 2 g and ij =2 g
0
implies ij \ S 6= ;.
The above denition identies changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the need of consent of any players outside of S. (i) requires that any new links
that are added can only be between players in S. This reects the fact that consent of
both players is needed to add a link. (ii) requires that at least one player of any deleted
link be in S. This reects that fact that either player in a link can unilaterally sever the
relationship.
A network g is strongly stable with respect to allocation rule Y and value function v
if for any S  N , g
0
that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i 2 S such that
Y
i
(g
0
; v) > Y
i
(g; v), there exists j 2 S such that Y
j
(g
0
; v) < Y
j
(g; v).
We denote the set of networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y and v by
SS(Y; v).
The denition of strong stability we use here is slightly stronger (i.e., harder to satisfy)
than that originally introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The denition of strong
stability here allows for a deviation to be valid if some members are strictly better o
and others are weakly better o, while the denition in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)
considers a deviation valid only if all members of a coalition are strictly better o. For
many value functions these denitions coincide.
There are several reasons for working with this stronger denition of strong stability.
First, it implies pairwise stability whereas the Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) version of
strong stability does not quite imply pairwise stability.
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Second, this stronger denition
allows for a stronger implication in Theorem 5, where we conclude that under certain
conditions on the value function all eÆcient networks are strongly stable. Third, the
converse of this statement in Theorem 5 is only true with the stronger denition of
5
For discussion of this and some weaker notions of eÆciency see Jackson (2001).
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Pairwise stability (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is dened as follows. A network g 2 G is
pairwise stable with respect to allocation rule Y given a value function v 2 V if no player benets
from severing one of their links and no two players benet from adding a link between them, with one
beneting strictly and the other at least weakly. This last part of the denition is what makes our
version of strong stability compatible with pairwise stability but the Dutta and Mutuswami version
incompatible.
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strong stability. Finally, if all members of a coalition are weakly better o and some
strictly better o, then any ability of members to make even tiny transfers will result in
a deviation. As we compare the denition of strong stability with what happens when
transfers are possible, this slightly stronger notion of stability is natural.
Such dierences between weak and strong inequalities are common to denitions of
Pareto eÆciency, the core, strong Nash equilibrium, and coalitional stability properties;
and the dierence sometimes has consequences. In working with the stronger denition
here, one ends up with a more attractive solution when it is non-empty, but in cases
where it is empty one might also wish to examine the weaker solution.
We remark that the strongly stable networks correspond exactly to the strong Nash
equilibria of the network formation game suggested by Myerson (1991). In that game
players simultaneously announce the set of players with whom they wish to be linked
and a link between two players forms if and only if both players have named each other.
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Cooperative Games and the Core
A TU cooperative game is a pair (N;w), where N is the set of players and w : 2
N
! IR
denes the productive value of each subset of N . In line with this interpretation w(;) = 0.
As we x N throughout our analysis, we often refer to a characteristic function
w : 2
N
! IR as a cooperative game.
An allocation x 2 IR
N
is in the core of w if
P
i2N
x
i
= w(N) and
P
i2T
x
i
 w(T ) for
all T  N .
2.1 A comparison of Pairwise and Strong Stability
To help understand some of the motivation for looking at strong stability, let us examine
an example where the dierence from pairwise stability becomes clear.
Example 1 A Trading Network
The following example is based on one from Jackson and Watts (1998).
The society consists of n individuals who get value from trading goods with each other.
In particular, there are two consumption goods and individuals all have the same utility
7
The equivalence holds for the corresponding denition of strong Nash equilibrium which requires
that there are no deviations by a coalition that make all members weakly better o and some strictly
better o. There are some details to verify, as there are some strong Nash equilibria where one player
names another but is not reciprocated. It is easy to check that the networks formed in such equilibria
must be strongly stable networks.
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function for the two goods which is Cobb-Douglas, u(x; y) = (xy)
1
2
. Individuals have a
random endowment, which is independently and identically distributed. A individual's
endowment is either (1,0) or (0,1), each with probability 1/2.
Individuals can trade with any of the other individuals in the same component of
the network. For instance, in a network g = f12; 23; 45g, individuals 1, 2 and 3 can
trade with each other and individuals 4 and 5 can trade with each other, but there is
no trade between 123 and 45. Trade ows without friction along any path and each
connected component trades to a Walrasian equilibrium. This means, for instance, that
the networks f12; 23g and f12; 23; 13g lead to the same expected trades, but lead to
dierent costs of links.
The network g = f12g leads to the following payos. There is a
1
2
probability that
one individual has an endowment of (1,0) and the other has an endowment of (0,1). They
then trade to the Walrasian allocation of (
1
2
;
1
2
) each and so their utility is
1
2
each. There
is also a
1
2
probability that the individuals have the same endowment and then there are
no gains from trade and they each get a utility of 0. Expecting over these two situations
leads to an expected utility of
1
4
.
Not accounting for the cost of links, the expected utility for a individual of being
connected to one other is
1
4
. The expected utility for a individual of being connected
(directly or indirectly) to two other individuals is
p
2
4
. It is easily checked that the
expected utility of a individual is increasing and strictly concave in the number of other
individuals that she is directly or indirectly connected to, ignoring the cost of links.
For the purpose of illustration, consider a situation where n = 3 and the cost to a link
is slightly above 1=2 and split equally among all members of the society. In this case,
there are two types of pairwise stable networks. One type is a network with two links,
so that all three players can trade with each other. The other is a network with no links.
The network with no links is ineÆcient, and it is only pairwise stable since players only
consider adding a link with one other player at a time - and the costs from doing this
outweigh the gains. However, if all three players can coordinate, then adding two links
makes all of them better o.
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This example is just one where strong stability provides an eective and natural
renement of pairwise stability.
8
There are other possible reasons to think the two link network might form as well, which have to
do with forward looking players who can anticipate the future continuations due to their actions, as in
Page and Wooders (2002).
8
3 The Existence of Strongly Stable Networks, EÆ-
ciency and the Core
Let us begin by showing that strong stability has some particular implications about the
structure of the allocation rule that must be in place.
Theorem 2 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v 2 V . If
Y is an anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation rule
and g 2 G with (g) 6= fNg is a network that is strongly stable with respect to Y and v,
then Y (g; v) = Y
ce
(g; v) and Y
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for each i 2 N .
The proof of this theorem and all other results are collected in the appendix.
Theorem 2 says that if we nd strong stability of a network that has more than one
component to it, then the allocation must be as it would be under the component-wise
egalitarian rule and in fact must involve an equal split of the total value of the network.
The idea behind the proof is quite simple and very compelling. Suppose that value
is not being split equally. Then, some player in some component (perhaps completely
disconnected) is getting a payo below some other player in some other component and
could deviate together with the other members of the second component to provide an
improving deviation.
Theorem 2 shows that a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value will necessarily
play a prominent role in the analysis of strongly stable networks.
The condition in the theorem that (g) 6= fNg is critical to the result. This is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 3 A Strongly Stable Network with One Component.
The are three individuals. Networks with two links have value 2.5, the complete
network has value 3, and other networks have 0 value. Consider the allocation rule
where the middle player in a two link network (e.g., player 2 in f12; 23g) gets a payo
of .1 and the other two players get a payo of 1.2, in the complete network each player
gets 1 and in networks with at most one link each player gets 0. In this example, any
network with two links is strongly stable. This relies on all players being part of a single
component in g.
As we will see below, the strong stability of the two link network under the non-
egalitarian allocation rule in the previous example depends critically on the inability
of players to make transfers to each other. Otherwise, they would deviate to form the
complete network. We return to make this point formally in Section 5 below.
To get insight into the role of component decomposability in the theorem, consider
the following example.
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Example 4 The Role of Component Decomposability.
There are n = 6 players. Let v be dened by v(f12; 23g) = 10, v(f12g) = 4, and v
is anonymous and component additive, so permutations of the above networks have the
same value, and v(f12; 23; 45g) = 14, v(f12; 23; 45; 56g) = 20, v(f12; 34; 56g) = 12, and
so on. For any other structure of a component (that has three or more links) we let v
have a value of 0.
On eÆcient networks such as f12; 23; 45; 56g, set Y
1
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) = Y
3
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) =
Y
4
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) = Y
6
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) = 3, and Y
2
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) = Y
5
(f12; 23; 45; 56g) =
4. Also, set Y
1
(f12; 23; 45g) = Y
1
(f12; 23g) = Y
3
(f12; 23g) = Y
3
(f12; 23; 45g) = 5 ,
Y
2
(f12; 23; 45g) = Y
2
(f12; 23g) = 0, and, in accordance with anonymity and component
balance, Y
4
(f12; 23; 45g) = Y
4
(f45g) = Y
5
(f45g) = Y
5
(f12; 23; 45g) = 2. Set Y elsewhere
to respect anonymity and component balance.
Note that f12; 23; 45; 56g is strongly stable, and yet Y diers from the component-
wise egalitarian rule. In particular, Y adjusts on f12; 23g depending on how 4, 5, and 6
are linked, if at all. We have done this in such a way to preclude blocking by a coalition
involving some players from f1; 2; 3g and players from f4; 5; 6g. However, the allocation
rule Y violates component decomposability.
Given the implications of Theorem 2 we focus on the component-wise egalitarian rule
in what follows. This is with a loss of generality, as Theorem 2 does not imply that Y
must equal Y
ce
on all networks, or in cases where all players are in a single component, as
indicated above. For instance, it is possible that an allocation rule happens to split value
equally on some networks and not others, and happens to split equally on the strongly
stable networks. While this is of interest, for now we concentrate on the component-wise
egalitarian rule. We will return to consider more general allocation rules when we discuss
transfers.
Given a value function v, let the cooperative game (N;w
v
) be dened by
w
v
(S) = max
g2g
S
v(g):
Thus, every value function v 2 V denes a cooperative game where the value of a
coalition is the maximum value it can obtain by arranging its members in a network.
Note that if v is anonymous, then w
v
is symmetric (so w
v
(S) = w
v
(T ) whenever
jSj = jT j). Also, if v is component additive, then w
v
is superadditive. That is, w
v
(S [
T )  w
v
(S) + w
v
(T ) whenever S \ T = ;.
Theorem 5 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v 2 V .
Some eÆcient g 2 G with respect to v is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
(; v) if and only
if the core of w
v
is nonempty. Moreover, SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ; if and only if E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v).
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Theorem 5 shows that our interest in guaranteeing that a society forms eÆcient
networks is closely tied to the non-emptiness of the core of a related cooperative game.
This allows us to make use of the substantial knowledge on core existence in cooperative
game theory to analyze the eÆciency of network formation.
On a supercial level Theorem 5 seems obvious, since both strong stability and the
core notion allow for deviations by arbitrary subsets of players.
9
However, there are
several levels on which Theorem 5 is not obvious (which can also be seen from the proof).
Moreover, these less obvious points are those which result in some of the theorem's power
and usefulness, as we will discuss in what follows.
In particular, some of the dierences are as follows. Strong stability allows for a
deviating coalition to maintain links with non-deviating players (and keeps the rest of
the network intact), while the core notion requires complete separation by a deviating
coalition. This gives better opportunities for a coalition to improve under the strong
stability notion. Working in the other direction is that the core allows for transfers to
be made among players in a deviating coalition regardless of how that coalition derives
its value, while under component balance a deviating coalition under the strong stability
notion cannot make transfers across components of a new network that is formed. With
these two critical dierences, there is no obvious reason to expect the relationship outlined
in the theorem to hold in general. Moreover, the last part of the theorem shows that it
is not simply that there exists a network that is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
(; v),
but that the eÆcient networks and strongly stable networks with respect to Y
ce
(; v)
coincide.
Application to Communication Networks and Convex Games
A special type of value function are those derived from some anonymous production
function that depends on the players who can communicate. The production function
is represented by a characteristic function z(S) which indicates the productive value of
any coalition S, provided they can communicate through the network. Each link in a
network incurs a cost c.
To be specic: a given cooperative game z and cost per link c lead to the value
function v
z;c
2 V dened by
v
z;c
(g) =
X
S2(g)
z(S) 
X
ij2g
c:
9
With the strong stability notion in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), where a deviation is valid only if
all members of a coalition are strictly better o, the equivalence does not hold. An example shows this.
There are 5 players. We describe an anonymous and component additive value function v. A network
encompassing 3 players has value 7 and a network encompassing 2 players has value 3. A network that
consists of one 2-player component and one 3-player component has value 10. All other networks have
value 0. In this setting, an eÆcient network consists of two components, one encompassing 2 players and
the other 3. Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, such a network is strongly stable as dened by
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). However, it follows by standard game-theoretic arguments that the core
of w
v
is empty.
11
A characteristic function z is zero-normalized if z(fig) = 0 for each i 2 N .
Given a symmetric cooperative game z, let z
k
= z(S) where jSj = k. So we write z as
a function of coalition size given the anonymity inherent from symmetry. Let Z denote
the class of zero normalized symmetric cooperative games.
A cooperative game z 2 Z is convex if
8k  2 : z
k
  z
k 1
 z
k 1
  z
k 2
Corollary 6 Consider any convex cooperative game z 2 Z and any cost per link c  0.
Then E(v
z;c
) = SS(Y
ce
; v
z;c
).
Corollary 6 shows that Theorem 5 has powerful implications, as the class of commu-
nication games with convex production and costly links is a wide class.
The proof of Corollary 6 is achieved by showing that the cooperative game w
v
z;c
is
convex and thus has a non-empty core. This is not immediate since although z is convex,
one needs to show that the induced game is still convex when link costs are accounted
for.
The scope of Corollary 6 does not extend arbitrarily to a class of games that is larger
than the class of convex games. We demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 7 A Non-Convex Game.
Consider the cooperative 5-player game (N; z) dened by z(S) = jSj if jSj  2 and
z(S) = 0 otherwise. This game is obtained from an additive game in which each player
contributes 1 to every coalition by setting the worth of one-player coalitions equal to 0.
Suppose that 0 < c < 1. Then an eÆcient network g consists of two components, one
with two players connected by a link and the other with three players connected by two
links. A network that is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
(; v
z;c
) partitions the player
set into three components, two of which have two players connected by one link and one
of which consists of an isolated player. Hence, no network that is eÆcient with respect
to v
z;c
is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
(; v
z;c
). In fact, it can be shown that for any
anonymous and component balanced allocation rule Y it holds that E(v
z;c
)\SS(Y; v
z;c
) =
;.
4 Primitive Conditions on Value Functions
While the non-emptiness of the core of the associated cooperative game w
v
is an in-
teresting and useful condition, as illustrated at the end of the last section, we are also
interested in direct conditions on v which characterize the strong stability of eÆcient
networks. Theorem 5 is still useful in this regard, as the characterization of v's that
12
allow for strongly stable networks to exist (and then coincide with eÆcient networks)
can be obtained through the conditions on w
v
.
A value function v is top convex if some eÆcient network also maximizes the per-
capita value among individuals.
10
Formally, let p(v; S) = max
g2g
S
v(g)
jSj
.
The value function v is top convex if p(v;N)  p(v; S) for all S.
One implication of top convexity is that all components of an eÆcient network must
lead to the same per-capita value. If some component led to a lower per capita value
than the overall average, then some other component would have to lead to a higher per
capita value. As we now see, top convexity plays a key role in the existence of strongly
stable networks.
Theorem 8 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v. The
core of w
v
is nonempty if and only if v is top convex. Thus, E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v) (or
SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ;) if and only if v is top convex.
Theorem 8 shows that one needs strong conditions on v in order to get have nice
properties in terms of the set of strongly stable networks. Nevertheless, the top convexity
condition is satised by many v's, and we now point out several such value functions.
Example 9 The Symmetric Connections Model
The symmetric connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is one where links
represent social relationships between individuals; for instance friendships.
11
These rela-
tionships oer benets in terms of favors, information, etc., and also involve some costs.
Moreover, individuals also benet from indirect relationships. A \friend of a friend" also
results in some benets, although of a lesser value than a \friend," as do \friends of a
friend of a friend" and so forth. The benet deteriorates with the \distance" of the rela-
tionship. For instance, in the network g = f12; 23; 34g individual 1 gets a benet Æ < 1
from the direct connection with individual 2, an indirect benet Æ
2
from the indirect con-
nection with individual 3, and an indirect benet Æ
3
from the indirect connection with
individual 4. As Æ < 1, this leads to a lower benet from an indirect connection than a
direct one. Individuals only pay costs, however, for maintaining their direct relationships.
10
A related condition is called \domination by the grand coalition," as dened in the context of a
cooperative game by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993). That condition requires that the
per capita value of the grand coalition be at least that of any sub-coalition. Shubik (1982, page 149)
shows that for symmetric cooperative games this condition is a necessary and suÆcient condition for
nonemptiness of the core. The top convexity condition we identify here is dened for the network setting,
but is equivalent to requiring that w
v
be dominated by the grand coalition. In a bargaining context,
Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta show that this condition is equivalent to existence of a sequence
of limiting eÆcient stationary equilibria for each bargaining protocol in a wide class.
11
For further study of variations on the connections model, see Johnson and Gilles (2000), Watts
(2001), and Jackson (2001).
13
Formally, the payo player i receives from network g is
u
i
(g) =
X
j 6=i
Æ
t(ij)
 
X
j:ij2g
c;
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =1
if there is no path between i and j). The value in the connections model of a network g
is simply v(g) =
P
i
u
i
(g).
It is easily seen that v is top convex for all values of Æ 2 [0; 1) and c  0, so that all
networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
and v are eÆcient with respect to
v.
12
We remark that Y
ce
i
(g; v) 6= u
i
(g) for some networks g. Thus, our result is not in
contradiction with the nding of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that sometimes none of
the pairwise stable networks (under u
i
) are eÆcient in the connections model. Here the
reallocation of value under the component-wise egalitarian rule helps in guaranteeing
stability of the eÆcient network.
13
Example 10 The Co-Author Model
The co-author model (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is described as follows.
Each individual is a researcher who spends time working on research projects. If two
researchers are connected, then they are working on a project together. The amount of
time researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of projects,
n
i
, that he is involved in. Formally, i's production is represented by
u
i
(g) =
X
j:ij2g
 
1
n
i
+
1
n
j
+
1
n
i
n
j
!
for n
i
> 0, and u
i
(g) = 0 if n
i
= 0.
14
The total value is v(g) =
P
i
u
i
(g).
Provided that n is even, it is easily seen that v is top-convex as the eÆcient network
always involves pairs of players who are only linked to each other. Thus strongly stable
networks exist in this situation (under Y
ce
), and correspond to the networks with evenly
12
The proof of Proposition 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provides some hints to the interested
reader in lling in omitted details. Most importantly, for intermediate cost ranges the per capita value
of the (eÆcient) star network is growing in the number of players in the star.
13
More generally (beyond the connections model) Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) study when using
the component-wise egalitarian rule provides for the pairwise stability of some eÆcient network. The
characterizing condition that they identify, critical link monotonicity, is necessarily a weaker condition
than top convexity, as pairwise stability is correspondingly weaker than strong stability.
14
It might also make sense to set u
i
(g) = 1 when an individual has no links, as the person can still
produce research. This is not in keeping with the normalization of v(;) = 0, but it is easy to simply
subtract 1 from all payos and then view Y as the extra benets above working alone.
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matched pairs. If n is odd, top convexity is violated (dropping some individual increases
the per capita value obtainable), and no strongly stable networks exist.
15
The dependence on even versus odd numbers is a bit disturbing and provides an
interesting example to discuss the precise denition of strong stability. If we instead
of our current denition which only requires one player to be strictly better o in the
deviation, we were to require both players to be better o in a deviation, then there
would exist a stable network here when there are odd numbers. However, if we then
introduce any sort of side payments (as we discuss below) there would again not exist
a stable network. This sensitivity of existence to precise denition does echo similar
features of existence of the core as well as strong Nash equilibrium, and reminds us of
how demanding the requirement of strong stability is. While this causes some existence
problems, the notion is still of interest given its very nice properties and existence in
some interesting contexts.
Example 11 Bilateral Bargaining Model
Corominas-Bosch (1999) considers a bargaining model where buyers and sellers bar-
gain over prices for trade. A link is necessary between a buyer and seller for a transaction
to occur, but if an individual has several links then there are several possibilities as to
whom they might transact with. Thus, the network structure essentially determines
bargaining power of various buyers and sellers.
More specically, each seller has a single unit of an indivisible good to sell which has
no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation of 1 for a single unit of the good. If a
buyer and seller exchange at a price p, then the buyer receives a payo of 1  p and the
seller a payo of p. A link in the network represents the opportunity for a buyer and
seller to bargain and potentially exchange a good.
16
Regardless of any costs to links, it is clear that per-capita value is maximized with
buyers and sellers paired up. So, if there is a matched number of buyers and sellers, then
v is top convex and so strongly stable networks exist and coincide with the eÆcient ones.
As with the co-author model, if there is not a matched number, then v is not top convex
as a subcoalition excluding the extra unmatched players could increase per-capita value.
So, in this case no strongly stable network exists.
15
Our results tell us that eÆcient networks are the only candidates. If players are matched in pairs,
there is always a player left out. A coalition of some matched player and the unmatched player can
deviate, making the unmatched player better o with the matched player being indierent.
16
In the Corominas-Bosch framework links can only form between buyers and sellers. One can t this
into the more general setting where links can form between any individuals, by having the value function
and allocation rule ignore any links except those between buyers and sellers.
15
5 Strong Stability with Side Payments
Once we allow for coalitional deviations, so presumably coalitions can coordinate their ac-
tions, in many contexts it is reasonable to assume that they will also be able to reallocate
value. This leads to the formulation of an even stronger stability concept.
Say that g is SSS (strongly stable with side payments) relative to an allocation rule
Y and value function v if
P
i2S
Y
i
(g; v) 
P
i2S
Y
i
(g
0
; v) for any S  N and g
0
obtainable
from g by S. We denote this set SSS(Y; v).
Theorem 12 Let v 2 V be component additive and anonymous. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y; v) 6= ;,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y; v) = E(v),
(iii) E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v),
(iv) E(v) = SSS(Y
ce
; v).
Theorem 12 reinforces the implications of Theorem 2 that component-wise egalitarian
allocation of value plays a key role in the existence of strongly stable networks, this time
including the possibility of side payments. So beyond Y
ce
's natural appeal in terms of
egalitarian properties, we nd that it is a key allocation rule to understand when it comes
to nding existence of strongly stable networks and for strongly stable networks with side
payments.
An example shows that the result is not true if one changes SSS to SS in part (i) or
(ii) of Theorem 12.
Example 13 Strong Stability with Side Payments
There are 6 players. A circle encompassing all six players has value 6 and a star
encompassing four players has value 5. All other networks have value 0. For the alloca-
tion rule Y that we describe momentarily the eÆcient networks (circles) are exactly the
strongly stable networks. According to Y each player gets 1 if they are in a circle. If g
is a four person star, then the player who is the center of the star gets 0 and the three
outside players in the star each get
5
3
. Players get 0 according to Y otherwise. For this Y ,
it holds that E(v) = SS(Y; v) 6= ;. Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, however,
the circle is not strongly stable. Hence, E(v) \ SS(Y
ce
; v) = ; and the equivalence in
Theorem 12 would not hold.
If a network is SSS then it is stable in a very strong sense and so Theorem 12, together
with our other results, shows that any top convex value function v (and only such value
functions!) will have networks that are stable in very strong ways.
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6 Non-anonymous Value Functions
So far, we have limited our attention to anonymous value functions. Let us consider the
extent to which similar results hold for non-anonymous value functions.
If we do not require the value function to be anonymous, then the component-wise
egalitarian rule is not as appealing.
Example 14 The Component-Wise Egalitarian Rule for a Non-Anonymous Value Func-
tion.
Consider a situation with 3 players and denote g
1
= f13g, the network with only
the link between players 1 and 3, and g
2
= f23g. The value function v is dened by
v(g
1
) = v(g
2
) = 1 and v(g) = 0 for all other g  g
N
. Then x dened by x
1
= x
2
= 0 and
x
3
= 1 is in the core of w
v
. However, E(v) = fg
1
; g
2
g and SS(Y
ce
; v) = ;, so that no
eÆcient network is strongly stable (or strongly stable with side payments) with respect
to the component-wise egalitarian rule. The reason is that Y
ce
gives too much to players
1 and 2 and not enough to player 3.
The following theorem provides an analog of the previous results if we do not require
the value function to be anonymous.
Theorem 15 Let v 2 V be a component additive value function. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) the core of w
v
is nonempty,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y; v) 6= ;,
(iii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that E(v) = SSS(Y; v).
Moreover, top convexity of v implies each of the above and also implies that E(v) =
SS(Y
ce
; v).
In the setting of non-anonymous value functions, top convexity of v, nonemptiness
of the core of w
v
, and E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v) are no longer equivalent. In the example with
which we started the current section, the core of w
v
is nonempty, while E(v) 6= SS(Y
ce
; v)
and v is not top convex.
Example 16 Non-Anonymity and Top Convexity
For an example of a value function v such that E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v) while the core of w
v
is empty (and v is not top convex), consider 4 players and dene g
1
= f12g, g
2
= f34g,
g
3
= f13; 34g, and g
4
= f23; 34g. The non-anonymous value function v is dened by
v(g
1
) = 4, v(g
2
) = 8, v(g
1
[ g
2
) = 12, v(g
3
) = v(g
4
) = 11, and v(g) = 0 for all other
17
g  g
N
. Then, network g
1
[ g
2
= f12; 34g is the unique eÆcient network and it is also
the unique network that is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
and v. However, the core
of w
v
is empty because any core element x would have to simultaneously satisfy the
requirements x
1
+ x
2
= 4, x
3
+ x
4
= 8, x
1
+ x
3
+ x
4
 11, and x
2
+ x
3
+ x
4
 11, which
is clearly impossible.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, Theorem 2 showed that the
component-wise egalitarian rule plays a prominent role in the study of the existence
strongly stable networks. This was reinforced in some of the other results which are, for
anonymous value functions, all captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 17 Let v be component additive and anonymous. The following statements
are equivalent:
17
(i) SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ;,
(ii) SS(Y
ce
; v) = E(v),
(iii) the core of w
v
is nonempty,
(iv) v is top convex,
(v) SSS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ;,
(vi) SSS(Y
ce
; v) = E(v),
(vii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y; v) 6= ;,
(viii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y; v) = E(v).
Theorem 15 summarizes the results for non-anonymous value functions.
Throughout our analysis in this paper we have focused our attention on component
additive value functions. These are natural in the context of some social relationships,
exchange relationships, etc., but are not so natural when dierent components of the
network might be in competition with each other (e.g., political or trade alliances). On
one level, once we move beyond component additive value functions, Y
ce
exhibits even
stronger properties. That is because under our denitions, Y
ce
can split value completely
evenly among all players and thus result in exactly the set of eÆcient networks always
17
Note that (v) was not included in our earlier statements, but is easily seen to be equivalent given
that it is implied by (vi) and implies (i).
18
being strongly stable. Thus strongly stable networks always exist and coincide with the
eÆcient networks.
This conclusion, however, depends on how one denes component balance when v is
not component additive. If one has further information about the value accruing to each
component when v is not component additive, then one could require that Y allocate the
value of each component to that component even when there exist externalities.
18
With
externalities, how players are arranged when some group deviates matters in determining
the value of the deviating coalition. This changes the nature of stable networks under
a variety of dierent stability concepts, as is nicely demonstrated in a new paper by
Currarini (2002). The general existence of strongly stable networks in such settings is a
diÆcult and open problem.
19
Finally, once one opens the door to coalitional considerations there are a variety
of questions that one has to deal with. For instance, what about immunity to further
deviations of subcoalitions, as in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium? What about reactions
from players not in the coalition? There are a host of such questions that have clear
analogs in dening core and coalition based equilibrium concepts, and so we do not
rehash them here. We simply mention that it will be worthwhile to investigate what new
issues they raise in the network context as the network structure adds new features to
the problem as we have already seen.
18
The argument for doing this in the presence of externalities is not quite as clear cut as in the case
where no externalities are present, unless one assumes that no transfers are made at all.
19
The problem has some similarities to the existence of core stable partitions in coalition formation
games when there are externalities. See Bloch (2001) for some discussion of that problem.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider an anonymous and component additive v and any
anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation rule Y . Con-
sider g 2 G that has more than one component and is strongly stable. It follows from
component balance of Y that
P
i2N
Y
i
(g; v) = v(g). Consider any S and S
0
2 (g) such
that S 6= S
0
. Without loss of generality, assume that max
i2S
Y
i
(g; v)  max
i2S
0
Y
i
(g; v).
Find j 2 argmax
i2S
Y
i
(g; v) and k 2 argmin
i2S
0
Y
i
(g; v). To prove that Y
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for all i, we need only show that Y
j
(g; v) = Y
k
(g; v). Suppose, to the contrary that
Y
j
(g; v) > Y
k
(g; v). Consider a deviation by S [fkg n fjg so that k severs all links under
g, Snfjg severs all links with j, and S[fkgnfjg form a component h
0
that is a duplicate
of g(S) with k replacing j. By component decomposability and anonymity it follows that
Y
i
(h
0
; v) = Y
i
(g; v) for all i 2 S n fjg and Y
k
(h
0
; v) = Y
j
(g; v) > Y
k
(g; v). This contradicts
the strong stability of g via a deviation by S [ fkg n fjg. Thus our supposition was
incorrect. Given that Y is component balanced and Y
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for all i, it follows
that Y
ce
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for all i.
Proof of Theorem 5: The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 18 Consider an anonymous and component additive value function v 2 V . If
the core of w
v
is nonempty, then x dened by x
i
=
w
v
(N)
n
for each i is in the core of w
v
.
Proof of Lemma 18: Given the symmetry of w
v
(implied by the anonymity of
v), the core of w
v
is symmetric. The core is also convex by standard arguments. The
statement of the lemma follows from the convexity and symmetry of the core of w
v
, as
taking any x in the core and averaging all of its permutations leads to identical payos
of
w
v
(N)
n
.
20
To complete the proof of Theorem 5, we prove that for any anonymous and component
additive value function v the following statements are equivalent
(1) SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ;,
(2) SS(Y
ce
; v) = E(v),
(3) the core of w
v
is nonempty.
It is clear that (2) implies (1). We start by showing that (1) implies (3).
Suppose to the contrary that g is strongly stable with respect to Y
ce
(; v), and that
the core of w
v
is empty. Since by supposition the core is empty, we know that Y
ce
(g; v) is
not a core element. Because g 2 SS(Y
ce
; v), it holds that Y
ce
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for each i (this
20
A similar proof in a dierent context appears in Shubik (1982, page 149).
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follows by Theorem 2 when there is more than one component, and directly otherwise).
Thus, there exists a T  N such that w
v
(T ) >
P
i2T
v(g)
n
, which implies that
w
v
(T )
jT j
>
v(g)
n
.
By the denition of w
v
it then follows that there exists some S  T and g
0
with S 2 (g
0
)
such that
v(g
0
(S))
jSj
>
v(g)
n
. This contradicts the strong stability of g. So, our supposition
was incorrect and the conclusion is established.
Next, let us show that (3) implies (1).
We show the stronger statement that if the core of w
v
is nonempty, then E(v) 
SS(Y
ce
; v). Suppose that the core of w
v
is nonempty and let g be eÆcient with respect
to v. Dene x by x
i
=
w
v
(N)
n
for each i. Then
P
S2(g)
v(g(S)) = v(g) =
P
i2N
x
i
=
P
S2(g)
P
i2S
x
i
. Also, Lemma 18 tells us that x is in the core of w
v
, and so
P
i2S
x
i

w
v
(S)  v(g(S)) for each S 2 (g). Hence, all weak inequalities must hold with equality,
so that
P
i2S
x
i
= v(g(S)) for each S 2 (g). Dene a component balanced allocation rule
Y by Y
i
(g
0
; v) = x
i
v(g
0
(S))
P
j2S
x
j
for each g
0
2 g
N
, S 2 (g
0
), and i 2 S. With this construction,
it follows that x
i
 Y
i
(g
0
; v) for each g
0
2 g
N
and i 2 N ; and also that Y
i
(g; v) = x
i
for any
g 2 E(v) and i 2 N . This implies that Y
i
(g; v) = x
i
 Y
i
(g
0
; v) for each g 2 E(v), S  N ,
g
0
2 g
N
reachable from g by S, and i 2 S; which proves that g 2 SS(Y; v). However,
note that Y (; v) coincides with Y
ce
(; v), because Y
i
(g
0
; v) = x
i
v(g
0
(S))
P
j2S
x
j
=
v(g
0
(S))
jSj
for each
g
0
2 g
N
, S 2 (g
0
), and i 2 S. We therefore conclude that g 2 SS(Y
ce
; v).
To complete the proof, let us show that (1) implies (2).
We have shown above that E(v)\SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ; implies (3) and that (3) implies that
E(v)  SS(Y
ce
; v). Thus, we know thatE(v)\SS(Y
ce
; v) 6= ; impliesE(v)  SS(Y
ce
; v).
Next, we argue that (1) implies ; 6= SS(Y
ce
; v)  E(v). Consider a strongly stable g. If
it is not eÆcient, then there exists g
0
such that v(g
0
) > v(g). It follows that there exists
some S 2 (g
0
) such that
v(g
0
(S))
jSj
>
v(g)
n
. Since, as argued above Y
ce
i
(g; v) =
v(g)
n
for all
i, this contradicts the strong stability of g and so we conclude that g must be eÆcient.
Thus, (1) implies both SS(Y
ce
; v)  E(v) and E(v)  SS(Y
ce
; v), which is (2).
Proof of Corollary 6: We show that w
v
z;c
is convex and then the result follows from
Theorem 5 as the core of a convex game is non-empty. In what follows, we x z and c
and so we write w to indicate w
v
z;c
, and v to indicate v
z;c
.
It follows directly from the denition of w and the symmetry and zero-normalization
of z that w is symmetric and zero-normalized. Thus, we can also write w as a function
w
k
. For each k  n, let v(k) = v(g) where g = f12; 23; : : : ; k   1kg. Thus v(k) is the
value of a coalition of size k connected in a network that is a line. The function v(k)
can also be viewed a zero-normalized symmetric cooperative game. Let X(k) = fX 
f1; : : : ; kg
k
j k =
P
k
0
2X
k
0
g. We think of breaking k into a set of integers that sum to k,
and X(k) is the set of such decompositions. We can write
w
k
= max
X2X(k)
X
k
0
2X
v(k
0
): (1)
21
Since v(k) = z
k
  (k   1)c for k  1, it follows from convexity of z that
v(k)  v(k   1)  v(k   1)  v(k   2) (2)
for every k  3. So, v is \almost" convex, except possibly that it may be that v(2) =
v(2) v(1) < v(1) v(0) = 0. However, by standard arguments inequality (2) still implies
that if v(k
0
) > 0 then v(k
0
+k
00
)  v(k
0
)+v(k
00
) for any k
00
. This combined with equation
(1) implies that
w
k
= maxf0; v(k)g: (3)
It then follows directly from (2) and (3) that w is convex.
Proof of Theorem 8: Suppose that the core of w
v
is nonempty. Then by Lemma 18,
x dened by x
i
=
w
v
(N)
n
for each i is in the core of w
v
. Hence, for every S  N we have
P
i2S
x
i
= jSj
w
v
(N)
n
 w
v
(S) = jSj p(v; S). This results in p(v;N) =
w
v
(N)
n
 p(v; S), so
that v is top convex.
Now suppose that v is top convex. It is a straightforward exercise to show that then
x dened by x
i
=
w
v
(N)
n
for each i is in the core of w
v
.
Proof of Theorem 12: It is clear that (iv) implies (ii) and (ii) implies (i). So we
need only show that (i) implies (iii) implies (iv). To show that (i) implies (iii), rst, note
that for any component balanced Y , SSS(Y; v)  E(v). So, consider Y and g such that
g 2 SSS(Y; v)  E(v). This implies that the vector Y (g; v) is in the core of w
v
. From
Theorem 5, it then follows that (iii) holds.
Next, let us show that (iii) implies (iv). Let g 2 E(v) = SS(Y
ce
; v). Since we know
by Theorem 8 that v must be top-convex, it follows that Y
ce
i
(g; v)  Y
ce
i
(g
0
; v) for all i
and g
0
. Thus,
P
i2S
Y
ce
i
(g; v) 
P
i2S
Y
ce
i
(g
0
; v) for any S and g
0
, and so g 2 SSS(Y
ce
; v).
So we have shown that E(v)  SSS(Y
ce
; v) . Pairing this with SSS(Y
ce
; v)  E(v), it
follows that SSS(Y
ce
; v) = E(v).
Proof of Theorem 15: First, let us show the equivalence that (i) implies (iii) implies
(ii) implies (i).
Let us show that (i) implies (iii). It is clear that for any component balanced Y ,
SSS(Y; v)  E(v) simply from considering deviations by N . Thus, we need only show
that (i) implies that there exists a Y such that E(v)  SSS(Y; v). Let g 2 E(v) and let x
in the core of w
v
. Dene a component balanced allocation rule Y by Y
i
(g
0
; v) = x
i
v(g
0
(S))
P
j2S
x
j
for each g
0
2 g
N
, S 2 (g
0
), and i 2 S. With this construction, it follows analogously to
the part of the proof of Theorem 5 where it is proved that (3) implies (1), that for S  N
and g
0
2 g
N
reachable from g by S we have
P
i2S
Y
i
(g; v) =
P
i2S
x
i

P
i2S
Y
i
(g
0
; v). This
proves that g 2 SSS(Y; v).
It is clear that (iii) implies (ii).
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We complete the equivalence proof by showing that (ii) implies (i). Let Y be a
component balanced allocation rule such that SSS(Y; v) 6= ;. Since SSS(Y; v)  E(v),
we can nd g 2 E(v) \ SSS(Y; v). It follows directly that Y (g; v) is in the core of w
v
.
Next, let us show the remaining statements of the theorem. If v is top convex, then
it is a straightforward exercise to show that then x dened by x
i
=
w
v
(N)
n
for each i is in
the core of w
v
.
Finally, let us show that if v is top convex and component additive, then E(v) =
SS(Y
ce
; v). Let g 2 E(v). Then
v(g)
n
= p(v;N) = max
SN
p(v; S) and, hence,
v(g(S))
jSj
=
v(g)
n
for each S 2 (g). Then, for each i 2 N we have Y
ce
i
(g; v) = p(v;N) , the maximum
a player can get in any network. Hence, g 2 SS(Y
ce
; v). Suppose g =2 E(v). Then
Y
ce
i
(g; v)  p(v;N) for all i 2 N with strict inequality for at least one i 2 N . A
g
0
2 E(v) is reachable from g by N , and Y
ce
i
(g
0
; v) = p(v;N) for each i 2 N . This shows
that g =2 SS(Y
ce
; v).
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